OECD CompStats / comparative research desk
Competition Enforcement Comparison Studio
Compare reported merger-control activity across OECD jurisdictions in common published years. Counts describe authority activity, not the effectiveness of enforcement or market outcomes.
- Jurisdiction universe
- 59
- economies and regional authorities
- Published measures
- 8
- merger-control activity series
- Observation window
- 2015-2024
- 10 exact annual frames
- Comparison limit
- 2-4
- jurisdictions per shared workspace
Activity magnitude is not enforcement quality.
Jurisdiction comparison workspace
Compare reported activity without manufacturing a performance score
30 published values across 3 selected jurisdictions and 10 exact years.Selected jurisdictions
3 / 4Linked comparative reading
2024 selected-jurisdiction evidence note
Published counts span GBR 28 to USA 1,934.
3 of 3 selected jurisdictions report this exact OECD measure in 2024. Count ranks order administrative activity only; they do not rank authority quality, deterrence, or effectiveness.
- Reported
- 3/3
- Selected spread
- 1,906
- Global rank field
- 58
3 of 3 paths have at least two published frames.
Movement uses each jurisdiction's first and last published values inside 2015-2024. Exact endpoint years remain attached; gaps are not interpolated and count changes are not normalized.
- Comparable
- 3/3
- Increased
- 2
- Decreased
- 1
3 of 3 selected series are complete across the window.
10 of 10 years are common to every selected path, with 0 missing cells. The separate intervention ratio appears only when all four same-jurisdiction, same-year inputs are published.
- Complete series
- 3/3
- Common years
- 10/10
- Missing cells
- 0
USA 0.78% to GBR 28.57%. This is a descriptive activity ratio, not an effectiveness measure.
Same-source trajectory
Merger decisions, 2015-2024
Focus-year readout
2024 decisions
- Activity rank
- 1 / 58
- Intervention ratio
- 0.78%
- Period change
- +10.01%
- Coverage
- 10 / 10
- Activity rank
- 5 / 58
- Intervention ratio
- 1.26%
- Period change
- +25.16%
- Coverage
- 10 / 10
- Activity rank
- 42 / 58
- Intervention ratio
- 28.57%
- Period change
- -62.16%
- Coverage
- 10 / 10
Reporting continuity
Published and missing observations
Same-year measure matrix
All eight merger-control measures, 2024
| Measure | USAUnited States | EUEuropean Union | GBRUnited Kingdom |
|---|---|---|---|
| NotificationsMerger notifications reported to competition authorities. | 1,973activity rank 1 / 58 | 392activity rank 5 / 58 | 39activity rank 41 / 58 |
| DecisionsMerger decisions reported by competition authorities. | 1,934activity rank 1 / 58 | 398activity rank 5 / 58 | 28activity rank 42 / 58 |
| Phase One clearancesPhase One or single-phase clearances without remedies. | 1,914activity rank 1 / 58 | 390activity rank 5 / 58 | 18activity rank 46 / 58 |
| Phase One remediesPhase One or single-phase clearances with remedies. | 0activity rank 58 / 58 | 5activity rank 5 / 58 | 5activity rank 6 / 58 |
| Phase Two clearancesPhase Two clearances after an in-depth investigation without remedies. | 5activity rank 4 / 49 | 3activity rank 7 / 49 | 2activity rank 12 / 49 |
| Phase Two remediesPhase Two clearances with remedies. | 8activity rank 5 / 49 | 0activity rank 31 / 49 | 2activity rank 15 / 49 |
| ProhibitionsPhase One or Phase Two prohibitions, challenges, or trials. | 7activity rank 2 / 58 | 0activity rank 38 / 58 | 1activity rank 9 / 58 |
| WithdrawalsNotifications withdrawn by merging parties. | 12activity rank 3 / 58 | 3activity rank 14 / 58 | 3activity rank 15 / 58 |
Exact comparison ledger
Decisions, 2015-2024
| Year | USAUnited States | EUEuropean Union | GBRUnited Kingdom |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1,758 | 318 | 74 |
| 2016 | 1,775 | 354 | 72 |
| 2017 | 1,985 | 375 | 61 |
| 2018 | 2,023 | 393 | 51 |
| 2019 | 2,008 | 362 | 49 |
| 2020 | 1,613 | 351 | 42 |
| 2021 | 3,403 | 395 | 47 |
| 2022 | 3,048 | 368 | 40 |
| 2023 | 1,712 | 332 | 51 |
| 2024 | 1,934 | 398 | 28 |
Interpretation boundary
A comparison of administrative activity, not a league table.
Notification thresholds, legal mandates, review systems, authority scope, transaction volume, and reporting practices differ across jurisdictions. The studio preserves those limits and supplies descriptive comparisons for research question formation, not judgments about legal correctness, deterrence, welfare, or agency performance.