Economic observatory / bounded measures
Antitrust indicator atlas
Find a measure, inspect its coverage, and follow its source records. Units, periods, and missing observations remain visible when comparing indicators.
Public coverage geometry
Where the indicator registry has depth
y = public rows (log)
MarketsIndustriesGeographiesNational contextDynamismMergersSingle-year snapshot
- Indicator series
- 306 bounded domains
- Observations
- 14,4274,092 bounded entities
- Relationship lenses
- 156,194 same-period pairs
- Source families
- 191978-2026
One bounded measureEvery series keeps its own unit, universe, period basis, source record, and documented methodology.
No composite indexRelationship views pair exact periods; they do not merge unlike measures or establish causal market power.
Merger activity / Transactions
HSR transactions reported
Federal premerger transactions reported by fiscal year.- Rows
- 10
- Fiscal year
- 1
- Coverage
- 2016-2025
Selected lens
HSR volume and Second Request rateExact same-period joins between paired measures, kept separate from single-series benchmarks.- Visible frame
- Loading Preparing bounded observation records
- Selected record
- Pending Available when observation records load
- Association
- Pending Computed after the bounded frame loads
- Evidence route
- Loading Resolving source custody
Evidence scopeAll source records
Relationship lens
HSR volume and Second Request rate
Figure lens
HSR transactions / RelationshipExact same-period joins between paired measures, kept separate from single-series benchmarks.- Visible frame
- Loading Preparing bounded observation records
- Selected record
- Pending Available when observation records load
- Benchmark
- Pending Computed after the bounded frame loads
- Reuse route
- JSON / CSV same bounded query state
Loading observation datasetPreparing the bounded HSR transactions series.
Pairing boundaryHSR transactions are federal premerger notifications, not a census of every U.S. merger. Second Requests are review-stage counts, not findings that a transaction was anticompetitive. The relationship does not show that filing volume causes review intensity.
Method note