{"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","dataset":"reports","count":11,"rows":[{"id":"rep-us-competition-landscape-2026","slug":"us-competition-landscape-2026","title":"The U.S. Competition Landscape","subtitle":"State of Competition 2026: five evidence systems, no single score","summary":"A national briefing that aligns defined-market signals, industry structure, state and local geographic concentration screens, merger activity, and enforcement records without collapsing their different scopes.","body":"Public evidence does not support a single national competition score. The clearest picture comes from five bounded systems. Among eight curated markets, four current profiles publish highly concentrated readings while four withhold HHI because public shares are incomplete or aggregate. The 2022 Economic Census publishes revenue-based HHI for 679 of 899 detailed six-digit industries, with a median of 284 among published rows; strict 2017-2022 comparisons remain a separate history lens. KFF's 2024 individual-market data place median state HHI at 3,414 and 36 of 51 jurisdictions above 2,500. A separately bounded 2025 FDIC screen places median statewide branch-deposit HHI at 903, with 5 of 51 jurisdictions above 2,500. A deeper FDIC layer publishes 3,104 county and county-equivalent branch-deposit screens with a median HHI of 2,826; 1,792 exceed 2,500 and 187 contain one reported organization. Banking markets are often local, but county boundaries may not match them, so both FDIC layers remain screens rather than legal market definitions. USDA's historical national beef-packer CR4 adds a buyer-side concentration anchor while remaining distinct from individual packer shares, regional cattle procurement markets, and the related Census slaughtering-industry revenue screen. The FY2025 HSR report records 2,006 reported transactions and a 2.1% Second Request rate among adjusted transactions. Dated enforcement records add procedure and institutional context, not causal proof. Read together, these systems identify where scrutiny and public disclosure are most valuable. Read as one composite, they would erase market definition, geography, vintage, and legal meaning. This report therefore presents a national competition landscape with explicit handoffs to the underlying markets, industries, state and local screens, merger series, policy records, and source dossiers.","coverImageUrl":"/generated-assets/report-cover-us-competition-landscape.png","publishedAt":"2026-07-19","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-wireless","mkt-airlines","mkt-housing","mkt-search","mkt-browser","mkt-pbm","mkt-ai-chatbot","mkt-meatpacking"],"sourceIds":["fcc-2024-cmr","bts-transtats-2026","jchs-rental-housing-2026","statcounter-search-us-2026","statcounter-browser-us-2026","ftc-pbm-interim-2024","statcounter-ai-chatbot-us-2026","usda-ers-meatpacking-2024","census-ecnsize-concentration-2022","census-ecnsize-concentration-2017","kff-individual-insurance-market-2024","fdic-sod-2025","ftc-doj-hsr-report-2025","doj-google-search-case-2020"],"sourceBasis":"2022 and 2017 U.S. Economic Census industry concentration tables, USDA ERS historical meatpacking CR4, KFF 2024 state individual-market HHI, FDIC 2025 statewide and county Summary of Deposits screens, the FY2025 FTC/DOJ HSR report, and source-backed market and enforcement records.","tableOfContents":["Executive synthesis","Defined market signals","Industry structure","Geographic concentration","Merger pipeline","Enforcement record","Public evidence agenda"],"preview":"A source-backed state-of-competition briefing across markets, industries, state systems, local banking screens, mergers, and enforcement, with every system kept in its own analytical universe.","publicationType":"state_of_competition","seriesTitle":"State of Competition","seriesNumber":"AR-SC-2026-01","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-19","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 19). The U.S. Competition Landscape: State of Competition 2026: five evidence systems, no single score. State of Competition, AR-SC-2026-01 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/us-competition-landscape-2026","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/us-competition-landscape-2026/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/us-competition-landscape-2026/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/fcc-2024-cmr","/sources/bts-transtats-2026","/sources/jchs-rental-housing-2026","/sources/statcounter-search-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-browser-us-2026","/sources/ftc-pbm-interim-2024","/sources/statcounter-ai-chatbot-us-2026","/sources/usda-ers-meatpacking-2024","/sources/census-ecnsize-concentration-2022","/sources/census-ecnsize-concentration-2017","/sources/kff-individual-insurance-market-2024","/sources/fdic-sod-2025","/sources/ftc-doj-hsr-report-2025","/sources/doj-google-search-case-2020"]},{"id":"rep-hhi-primer","slug":"hhi-primer","title":"How HHI Helps Explain Market Concentration","subtitle":"A public primer for reading concentration dashboards","summary":"An open explainer on HHI, CR4, effective number of firms, and why source coverage matters.","body":"HHI is the sum of squared market shares. It is useful because it gives larger firms more weight, but it is not a legal conclusion. This observatory reports HHI only when public sources provide enough reliable shares or when a public agency reports the metric directly. Market definition, geography, vintage, and missing firms can change interpretation. The mobile wireless profile uses FCC-reported HHI, while search and browser profiles use public usage-share tables with clear limitations.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-05-16","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-wireless","mkt-search","mkt-browser"],"sourceIds":["fcc-2024-cmr","statcounter-search-us-2026","statcounter-browser-us-2026"],"sourceBasis":"FCC source-reported HHI and StatCounter public usage-share tables.","tableOfContents":["What HHI measures","Where CR4 helps","Why source notes matter"],"preview":"A short public-interest guide to reading descriptive concentration metrics.","publicationType":"methodology_primer","seriesTitle":"Methods and Measures","seriesNumber":"AR-MM-2026-01","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-05-16","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, May 16). How HHI Helps Explain Market Concentration: A public primer for reading concentration dashboards. Methods and Measures, AR-MM-2026-01 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/hhi-primer","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/hhi-primer/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/hhi-primer/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/fcc-2024-cmr","/sources/statcounter-search-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-browser-us-2026"]},{"id":"rep-public-data-gaps","slug":"public-data-gaps","title":"Where Public Market-Share Data Runs Out","subtitle":"Why incomplete profiles are part of the product","summary":"An open report explaining why the observatory sometimes withholds HHI even when public facts indicate concentration.","body":"Incomplete profiles are not failures of the platform; they are a core credibility feature. The airline profile shows a high-quality BTS source but withholds HHI because the public table includes an aggregated Other category. The PBM profile uses FTC public findings on top-three and top-six concentration but withholds HHI because individual public shares are not provided in the press-release record. The observatory publishes what is known, what is missing, and what source would be needed next.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-05-16","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-airlines","mkt-pbm"],"sourceIds":["bts-transtats-2026","ftc-pbm-interim-2024"],"sourceBasis":"BTS public airline market-share table and FTC PBM interim staff report materials.","tableOfContents":["Why HHI is withheld","Examples from airlines and PBMs","What better source coverage would add"],"preview":"A transparency note on incomplete data and why the observatory never fills gaps with invented shares.","publicationType":"data_note","seriesTitle":"Public Data Notes","seriesNumber":"AR-DN-2026-01","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-05-16","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, May 16). Where Public Market-Share Data Runs Out: Why incomplete profiles are part of the product. Public Data Notes, AR-DN-2026-01 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/public-data-gaps","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/public-data-gaps/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/public-data-gaps/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/bts-transtats-2026","/sources/ftc-pbm-interim-2024"]},{"id":"rep-digital-gateways","slug":"digital-gateways-brief","title":"Five Digital Gateways","subtitle":"U.S. platform concentration across five separately bounded usage systems","summary":"A source-backed research brief tracing search, browser, mobile operating-system, social-referral, and AI-assistant concentration without collapsing them into one platform market or ecosystem score.","body":"U.S. digital-platform activity is not one market. This report tracks five separately bounded public systems: search referrals, browser page views, mobile operating-system page views, social-media referrals, and AI-assistant usage. At the latest published anchor, search usage reports HHI 7,359; browser page views 3,612; mobile operating-system page views 5,337; social referrals 4,995; and AI assistants 4,804. Those values share an HHI formula but not a denominator, participant universe, month, or legal meaning, so the report never averages or ranks them into a platform-power score. Four systems publish April 2023-April 2026 histories. Search HHI changed by -591 points, browsers by -52, mobile operating systems by +180, and social referrals by +1,602; AI assistants currently provide one May 2026 baseline. Official product-attribution records place Google-labeled products across five systems, Microsoft-labeled products across three, and Apple-labeled products across two. That recurrence is a research route into distribution, defaults, interoperability, multihoming, and switching, not a combined share or control conclusion. Stronger public evidence would add revenue, default-placement, installed-base, unique-user, engagement, enterprise and API usage, compute-access, and remedy-outcome measures while keeping every denominator explicit.","coverImageUrl":"/generated-assets/report-cover-concentration.png","publishedAt":"2026-07-20","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-search","mkt-browser","mkt-mobile-os","mkt-social-referral","mkt-ai-chatbot"],"sourceIds":["statcounter-search-us-2026","statcounter-browser-us-2026","statcounter-mobile-os-us-2026","statcounter-social-referral-us-2026","statcounter-ai-chatbot-us-2026"],"sourceBasis":"Five StatCounter U.S. public usage-share sources: April 2023-April 2026 search, browser, mobile operating-system, and social-referral anchors, plus the May 2026 AI-assistant baseline. Official product-attribution records remain a separate evidence layer.","tableOfContents":["Executive findings","Five-system evidence","Operator recurrence","Public evidence agenda","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"Five system histories, exact share rows, official product-attribution paths, and a public research agenda with every denominator kept separate.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-02","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-20","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 20). Five Digital Gateways: U.S. platform concentration across five separately bounded usage systems. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-02 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/digital-gateways-brief","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/digital-gateways-brief/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/digital-gateways-brief/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/statcounter-search-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-browser-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-mobile-os-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-social-referral-us-2026","/sources/statcounter-ai-chatbot-us-2026"]},{"id":"rep-housing-data-gap","slug":"housing-competition-data-gap","title":"Housing Competition Needs Local Ownership Data","subtitle":"Source-backed housing profile note","summary":"An open brief explaining why housing affordability and supply stress require local competition data before HHI can be responsibly reported.","body":"Housing competition cannot be reduced to one national HHI. Harvard JCHS reports 22.7 million cost-burdened renter households in 2024, Freddie Mac estimates a 3.7 million-home supply shortage as of Q3 2024, and GAO reports that institutional investors owned 22 percent of single-family rental homes in Jacksonville but 4 percent in Seattle in 2024. Those facts show why local market power matters, but they do not provide comparable firm-level local rental market shares. Antitrust Radar therefore publishes the public evidence, labels the local data gap, and withholds HHI until citable firm-level local shares are available.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-06-21","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-housing"],"sourceIds":["jchs-rental-housing-2026","freddie-mac-housing-supply-2024","gao-institutional-sfr-2026","ftc-doj-rollups-2024"],"sourceBasis":"Harvard JCHS renter cost-burden data, Freddie Mac supply-shortage estimate, GAO selected single-family rental investor ownership data, and FTC/DOJ roll-up inquiry materials.","tableOfContents":["Why housing is local","Affordability and supply stress","Selected ownership evidence","Data needed for HHI"],"preview":"Explains why the housing profile reports public stress signals while withholding HHI pending local firm-level ownership and rental market-share data.","publicationType":"data_note","seriesTitle":"Public Data Notes","seriesNumber":"AR-DN-2026-02","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-06-21","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, June 21). Housing Competition Needs Local Ownership Data: Source-backed housing profile note. Public Data Notes, AR-DN-2026-02 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/housing-competition-data-gap","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/housing-competition-data-gap/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/housing-competition-data-gap/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/jchs-rental-housing-2026","/sources/freddie-mac-housing-supply-2024","/sources/gao-institutional-sfr-2026","/sources/ftc-doj-rollups-2024"]},{"id":"rep-meatpacking-buyer-power","slug":"meatpacking-buyer-power","title":"Beef Meatpacking Buyer Power","subtitle":"Why an 85% procurement CR4 is not the same as an industry HHI","summary":"A source-backed briefing on national beef-packer buyer concentration, the related Census slaughtering-industry screen, and the market boundaries neither metric can establish.","body":"USDA Economic Research Service reports that the four largest beef packers handled 36 percent of U.S. steer and heifer purchases in 1980, 81 percent in 1995, and 85 percent by 2019. That national buyer-side CR4 documents a major structural shift, but it does not reveal individual packer shares or the regional procurement choices facing a particular rancher. The related 2022 Economic Census screen for NAICS 311611, Animal (except poultry) slaughtering, reports revenue HHI 1,250.7 and CR4 66.0, compared with HHI 1,174.8 and CR4 63.4 in 2017. The Census revenue screen and USDA procurement CR4 use different denominators and answer different questions, so Antitrust Radar keeps them linked but never combines them into one score. Stronger public evidence would publish individual packer purchase shares and reproducible regional procurement tables while retaining capacity, entry, cost, cattle-price, and wholesale-spread context.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-07-19","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-meatpacking"],"sourceIds":["usda-ers-meatpacking-2024","census-ecnsize-concentration-2022","census-ecnsize-concentration-2017"],"sourceBasis":"USDA ERS historical national CR4 for steer and heifer purchases, paired with separately bounded 2017 and 2022 Economic Census revenue concentration rows for NAICS 311611.","tableOfContents":["Buyer-side concentration","Historical shift","Related industry screen","Why the metrics differ","Public data agenda"],"preview":"Explains what the national beef-packer CR4 reveals, why HHI remains withheld, and how the related Census industry screen should be used without redefining a cattle procurement market.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-01","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-19","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 19). Beef Meatpacking Buyer Power: Why an 85% procurement CR4 is not the same as an industry HHI. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-01 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/meatpacking-buyer-power","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/meatpacking-buyer-power/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/meatpacking-buyer-power/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/usda-ers-meatpacking-2024","/sources/census-ecnsize-concentration-2022","/sources/census-ecnsize-concentration-2017"]},{"id":"rep-state-banking-structure","slug":"state-banking-structure-2015-2025","title":"State Banking Structure, 2015-2025","subtitle":"Stable national concentration can coexist with large state-level shifts","summary":"A source-backed research brief on eleven annual FDIC statewide branch-deposit screens, the changing geography beneath stable national aggregates, and the limits of statewide concentration measures.","body":"Across eleven annual June 30 FDIC Summary of Deposits screens, national branch-deposit HHI moved from 410 in 2015 to 401 in 2025, while the annual median across 51 jurisdictions moved from 958 to 903. Those aggregate shifts mask substantial geographic variation: 26 jurisdictions recorded higher HHI and 25 recorded lower HHI. Seven crossed a descriptive concentration classification. Five jurisdictions were highly concentrated at both endpoints, but Delaware entered that set while Nevada exited it. The national reported branch count fell 17.9 percent and the grouped organization count fell 29.3 percent, while nominal reported deposits rose 70.2 percent. These screens identify where structure changed; they do not establish why it changed, define a legal banking market, or measure every banking product.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20","relatedMarketIds":[],"sourceIds":["fdic-sod-2025"],"sourceBasis":"FDIC annual Summary of Deposits branch records for 2015-2025, independently grouped to the reported top bank holding company when available and otherwise to the insured institution.","tableOfContents":["Stable aggregates","State change map","Classification transitions","System capacity","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"Shows how a nearly unchanged national HHI can coexist with large state-level movements, classification turnover, and declining branch and organization counts.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-03","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-20","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 20). State Banking Structure, 2015-2025: Stable national concentration can coexist with large state-level shifts. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-03 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/state-banking-structure-2015-2025","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/state-banking-structure-2015-2025/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/state-banking-structure-2015-2025/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/fdic-sod-2025"]},{"id":"rep-business-dynamism-sectors","slug":"business-dynamism-across-sectors-1978-2023","title":"Business Dynamism Across U.S. Sectors, 1978-2023","subtitle":"Entry weakened nationally while broad-sector paths diverged","summary":"A source-backed research brief on 46 years of establishment and job flows, the different entry paths of 19 broad sectors, and a guarded cross-section linking 2023 entry to 2022 detailed-industry structure.","body":"From 1978 to 2023, the national establishment entry rate fell from 15.146 percent to 10.608 percent, a decline of 4.538 percentage points, while the exit rate fell 1.741 points. Gross job creation fell 7.458 points and excess job reallocation fell 4.695 points. Every one of the 19 broad Census sectors recorded lower establishment entry at the two endpoints, but the decline ranged from 1.608 points in health care and social assistance to 9.680 points in administrative and support services. In 2023, entry ranged from 5.266 percent in utilities to 14.851 percent in transportation and warehousing. A deliberately separate cross-section joins 2023 entry rates to 2022 medians of published six-digit industry HHI for 17 sectors and yields a descriptive correlation of -0.533. That association is not a causal estimate, legal market definition, sector HHI, or competition score. Business Dynamics Statistics measure firm, establishment, and job flows; stronger antitrust research requires compatible detailed-industry structure, ownership, financing, merger, entry, price, quality, and policy evidence.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20","relatedMarketIds":[],"sourceIds":["census-business-dynamics-2023","census-ecnsize-concentration-2022"],"sourceBasis":"U.S. Census Bureau 2023 Business Dynamics Statistics national and broad-sector annual tables for 1978-2023, paired only in a separately labeled cross-section with 2022 Economic Census medians of published six-digit industry HHI.","tableOfContents":["National flow track","Sector entry field","Structure and dynamism","Public research agenda","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"Shows the long decline in national business entry, the range of 19 broad-sector paths, and what a guarded 17-sector structure comparison can and cannot establish.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-04","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-20","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 20). Business Dynamism Across U.S. Sectors, 1978-2023: Entry weakened nationally while broad-sector paths diverged. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-04 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/business-dynamism-across-sectors-1978-2023","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/business-dynamism-across-sectors-1978-2023/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/business-dynamism-across-sectors-1978-2023/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/census-business-dynamics-2023","/sources/census-ecnsize-concentration-2022"]},{"id":"rep-federal-merger-review","slug":"federal-merger-review-2016-2025","title":"The Federal Merger Review Pipeline, 2016-2025","subtitle":"Notification volume swung widely while annual Second Request rates stayed between 1.6% and 3.0%","summary":"A source-backed research brief tracing ten fiscal years of HSR notifications, monthly activity, in-depth review, and the FY2025 transaction-size field without treating federal procedure as a finding of competitive harm.","body":"Across FY2016-FY2025, the federal HSR program recorded 22,235 reported transactions, 44,014 filings, and 21,496 adjusted transactions. Annual reported volume ranged from 1,637 in FY2020 to 3,520 in FY2021. FY2025 recorded 2,006 reported transactions, down 1.2 percent from FY2024. The annual Second Request rate among adjusted transactions ranged from 1.6 percent to 3.0 percent; 509 Second Requests across the ten-year adjusted denominator produce a descriptive pooled rate of 2.4 percent. FY2025 recorded 41 Second Requests, or 2.1 percent, down 0.9 percentage point from FY2024. Its transaction-size table covers all 1,944 adjusted transactions: 618, or 31.8 percent, were valued at $1 billion or more and accounted for 20 Second Requests. The corresponding 3.2 percent rate and the 1.6 percent rate below $1 billion are descriptive pipeline shares, not causal estimates. Monthly timing, clearance, Second Requests, public enforcement actions, remedies, abandonments, and later competitive outcomes remain distinct. HSR records do not cover every U.S. merger and do not by themselves show whether a reported transaction harmed competition.","coverImageUrl":null,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20","relatedMarketIds":[],"sourceIds":["ftc-doj-hsr-report-2025"],"sourceBasis":"Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 48th Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report, including FY2016-FY2025 annual and fiscal-month tables and the FY2025 transaction-size table.","tableOfContents":["Annual pipeline","Fiscal-month field","Transaction-size field","Exact annual ledger","Public research agenda","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"A ten-year map of federal merger notifications and review procedure with exact monthly and transaction-size evidence, source custody, and permanent outcome guardrails.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-05","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-20","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 20). The Federal Merger Review Pipeline, 2016-2025: Notification volume swung widely while annual Second Request rates stayed between 1.6% and 3.0%. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-05 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/federal-merger-review-2016-2025","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/federal-merger-review-2016-2025/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/federal-merger-review-2016-2025/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/ftc-doj-hsr-report-2025"]},{"id":"rep-fixed-broadband-geography","slug":"fixed-broadband-geographic-concentration-2020-2024","title":"Fixed Broadband Concentration Across Geographic Scales, 2020-2024","subtitle":"National HHI rose while median state, county, and census-tract concentration fell","summary":"A source-backed research brief on nine FCC fixed-broadband reporting periods, the divergent paths of national and subnational median HHI, and the public evidence needed to move from geographic screens to mechanisms and outcomes.","body":"From December 2020 to December 2024, the FCC-reported national HHI for residential fixed connections of at least 100 Mbps downstream and 20 Mbps upstream rose from 1,171 to 1,501, an increase of 330 points. Over the same endpoints, the median of separately calculated state HHIs fell from 3,328 to 2,937, the county median fell from 6,739 to 4,599, and the census-tract median fell from 7,195 to 5,504. All three subnational medians remained above 2,500 in December 2024. The semiannual path matters: national HHI reached 1,605 in June 2024 before ending at 1,501, so endpoint changes do not describe every movement. The complete evidence packet contains 36 rows across nine reporting periods and four geographic summaries. These values share an HHI scale but not one geographic meaning. The national value and the state, county, and tract medians are not interchangeable legal market definitions, and a median does not reveal the full distribution within or across areas. The release does not provide the provider identities and shares needed to inspect local structure directly or connect concentration to prices, speeds, quality, adoption, entry, buildout, subsidies, outages, switching, or competitive effects. The observed divergence is therefore a research finding and oversight signal, not a causal conclusion.","coverImageUrl":"/generated-assets/report-cover-concentration.png","publishedAt":"2026-07-24","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-fixed-broadband"],"sourceIds":["fcc-internet-access-dec-2024"],"sourceBasis":"Federal Communications Commission Internet Access Services Figure 5, covering nine semiannual reporting periods from December 2020 through December 2024 for residential fixed connections meeting the 100/20 Mbps threshold. The packet preserves the national HHI and medians of separately calculated state, county, and census-tract HHIs as distinct geographic summaries.","tableOfContents":["Geographic concentration paths","Endpoint divergence ledger","Exact observation ledger","Public evidence agenda","Reproduction packet","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"A four-scale FCC concentration history showing why a rising national HHI and falling subnational medians must be read together without converting them into one market.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-06","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-24","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 24). Fixed Broadband Concentration Across Geographic Scales, 2020-2024: National HHI rose while median state, county, and census-tract concentration fell. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-06 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/fixed-broadband-geographic-concentration-2020-2024","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/fixed-broadband-geographic-concentration-2020-2024/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/fixed-broadband-geographic-concentration-2020-2024/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/fcc-internet-access-dec-2024"]},{"id":"rep-state-individual-insurance","slug":"state-individual-insurance-concentration-2024","title":"State Individual Insurance Concentration, 2024","subtitle":"Highly concentrated readings appear in 36 of 51 jurisdictions","summary":"A source-backed research brief mapping the 2024 KFF state concentration cross-section for the ACA-regulated individual health insurance market, including HHI, leading-insurer share, rival depth, regional variation, and the public evidence needed for stronger competition analysis.","body":"KFF's 2024 individual-insurance dataset reports a median HHI of 3,414 across the 50 states and District of Columbia. Thirty-six of 51 jurisdictions, or 70.6 percent, report HHI at or above 2,500. Twenty-one jurisdictions report a leading-insurer share at or above 50 percent, and 27 report no more than three insurers with shares above 5 percent. The cross-section ranges from Wisconsin at HHI 1,474 to the District of Columbia at 6,945. Regional medians also differ: 3,864 in the Northeast, 3,644 in the South, 3,177 in the Midwest, and 2,811 in the West. Across the 51 jurisdiction rows, HHI has a descriptive Pearson correlation of 0.959 with leading-insurer share and -0.831 with the count of insurers above 5 percent. Those relationships reconcile internally related structure measures; they are not causal estimates or independent outcome evidence. This packet covers the source-defined 2024 ACA-regulated individual market only. It does not cover employer-sponsored insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, every insurance product, a state's overall economy, competitive effects, or legal liability. The public rows do not identify insurers or common control in each jurisdiction. Stronger research therefore requires firm-level state shares, stable ownership and plan identifiers, annual vintages, entry and exit events, and outcomes including premiums, network breadth, quality, switching, enrollment, claims, and consumer complaints.","coverImageUrl":"/generated-assets/report-cover-concentration.png","publishedAt":"2026-07-24","relatedMarketIds":["mkt-individual-insurance"],"sourceIds":["kff-individual-insurance-market-2024"],"sourceBasis":"KFF 2024 Individual Insurance Market Competition data for the 50 states and District of Columbia, including source-reported HHI, leading-insurer share, and the count of insurers with more than 5 percent of each jurisdiction's ACA-regulated individual market.","tableOfContents":["National distribution","State concentration map","Regional comparison","Structure relationships","Exact jurisdiction ledger","Public evidence agenda","Reproduction packet","Methodology and limits"],"preview":"A 51-jurisdiction KFF concentration cross-section showing where high HHI, leading-insurer share, and thin rival depth coincide, with every result bounded to the 2024 ACA individual market.","publicationType":"research_brief","seriesTitle":"Competition Research Briefs","seriesNumber":"AR-RB-2026-07","authorName":"Antitrust Radar Research Team","version":"1.0","updatedAt":"2026-07-24","publicationStatus":"current","revisionNote":"Initial public edition.","canonicalCitation":"Antitrust Radar Research Team. (2026, July 24). State Individual Insurance Concentration, 2024: Highly concentrated readings appear in 36 of 51 jurisdictions. Competition Research Briefs, AR-RB-2026-07 (Version 1.0). Antitrust Radar. https://antitrustradar.org/reports/state-individual-insurance-concentration-2024","citationDownloads":{"bibtex":"/reports/state-individual-insurance-concentration-2024/citation/bibtex","ris":"/reports/state-individual-insurance-concentration-2024/citation/ris"},"sourceProfileHrefs":["/sources/kff-individual-insurance-market-2024"]}]}